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Articles 
 
*101 GOVERNMENT RX-BACK TO THE FUTURE IN SCIENCE FUNDING? THE NEXT ERA IN DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Michael J. Malinowski [FNa1] 
 
Copyright (c) 2012 University of Louisville; Michael J. Malinowski  
We shall not cease from exploration [a]nd the end of all our exploring [w]ill be to arrive where we 
started [a]nd know the place for the first time. 
-T.S. Eliot [FN1] 
 
I. Introduction: 5:30 AM, Monday, July 16, 1945 
 
[T]he atomic age began. While Manhattan staff members watched anxiously, the device exploded over 
the New Mexico desert, vaporizing the tower and turning asphalt around the base of the tower to green 
sand. The bomb released approximately 18.6 kilotons of power, and the New Mexico sky was suddenly 
brighter than many suns. Some observers suffered temporary blindness even though they looked at the 
brilliant light through smoked glass. Seconds after the explosion came a huge blast, sending searing heat 
across the desert and knocking some observers to the ground. A steel container weighing over 200 tons, 
standing a half-mile from ground zero, was knocked ajar. . . . As the orange and yellow fireball stretched 
up and spread, a second column, narrower than the first, rose and flattened into a mushroom shape, 
thus providing the atomic age *102 with a visual image that has become imprinted on the human 
consciousness as a symbol of power and awesome destruction. [FN2] 
The uranium atom was split successfully in early 1939. [FN3] Fearing that the Nazis could and would 
develop an atomic bomb, the United States undertook the Manhattan Project to preempt the threat to 
the very existence of democratic society. [FN4] The Project was a massive federal government hands-on 
undertaking-a science research and development (“R&D”) mission that orchestrated establishment of 
several laboratories at sites across the United States, an army of researchers, and input from industry, 
most notably DuPont and the Kellogg Company. [FN5] 
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During the remainder of the twentieth century, U.S. investment became a concerted effort to promote 
both the advancement of science through academia and American global economic competitiveness. 
[FN6] This duality served the United States well given that industry and academia did not share a science 
culture at the time and tended to remain separate. [FN7] The U.S. government acted as an intermediary 
and invested to advance science on both fronts. [FN8] Former President Eisenhower recognized this rite 
of passage and its implications and shared his vision in a farewell address he delivered through a radio 
and television broadcast on January 17, 1961: 
[R]esearch has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily 
increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government. 
. . . . 
The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the 
power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research and 
discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and *103 opposite danger that 
public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite. It is the task of 
statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the 
principles of our democratic system-ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society. [FN9] 
As discussed in detail in Part II, subsequent to the Manhattan Project, three distinguishable eras of U.S. 
government science funding have unfolded. [FN10] In prescription drug development, with its enormous 
human health and economic implications, much reliance has been placed upon industry. [FN11] Industry 
has taken responsibility for the vast majority of clinical research and drug distribution and marketing, 
while the U.S. government has generously funded basic (bench) research, largely through the National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”) and National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”). [FN12] Among governments, the 
United States remains the lead global financial investor and producer of biomedical R&D by a wide 
margin. [FN13] 
Unfortunately, the United States has sunk into a drug development dilemma, which is addressed in Part 
III. Government funding of basic research has gifted industry with resources for drug R&D, including a 
map *104 of the human genome. [FN14] Nevertheless, as observed by Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the 
NIH, the drug industry's “productivity has been declining for fifteen years” and shows no signs of 
improving. [FN15] This Article proposes that the federal government respond to the drug development 
dilemma by, in the spirit of the Manhattan Project and Human Genome Project (“HGP”), reducing 
reliance on industry and substantially expanding the presence of both NIH and the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) in human clinical research. 
 
II. Science Funding: The U.S. Legacy [FN16] 
 
“The threat of annihilation of democratic society during World War II . . . by advances in technology 
inspired tremendous U.S. investment to raise the base of science.” [FN17] The United States continued 
and increased its investment, other governments did the same and, as explained below, government 
involvement matured into our present, shared research establishment-with the fulcrum for drug 
development resting heavily on industry and commercialization. [FN18] This evolution unfolded in three 
eras distinguishable by their origins and nature: the military-industrial complex (“MIC”) era (1939 to the 
present); an era of academia-industry separation *105 (mid-1940s into the 1980s); and an era of 
government-academia-industry integration which commenced in 1980 and extends into the present. 
[FN19] 
 
A. The Military-Industrial Complex Era 
 
The MIC era grew out of World War II (“WWII”). The United States entered WWII without a standing 
army and with little meaningful infrastructure to manufacture military weapons. [FN20] The war effort 
imposed a focus on application in science and technology, and the U.S. government became a contract 
purchaser and financier of invention by both academia and industry. [FN21] The United States left WWII 
with established, expansive, and ongoing relationships with industry and academia. [FN22] Generally, 
the flow of federal funding shifted into relationships with industry to build the MIC and into separate 
university grant funding-academic research, meaning research for the sake of research rather than more 
immediate commercial application. [FN23] The latter was advanced immensely through Science: The 
Endless Frontier, [FN24] a 1945 report to President Truman from Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office 
of Scientific Research and Development. “Its main goal was to recommend establishing the United 
States Office of Research and Development, which in time morphed into the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) and NIH, chiefly to fund the basic research needed to undergird the full range of 
applied sciences.” [FN25] Financial support of the same became a permanent major expenditure and 
budget priority. [FN26] The MIC continued, just as President Eisenhower predicted, and raged in the 
decades following his farewell address, culminating in today's “War on Terror.” [FN27] 
 
*106 B. Era of Academia-Industry Separation 
 
The era of separation between academia and industry was facilitated by a duality in federal funding. To 
the side of MIC funding, most research grants to universities were issued through review by academic 
peers to promote research for the sake of advancing science, largely removed from any serious 
consideration of application. [FN28] University researchers applied for the same. [FN29] Industry was 
concerned about commingling their research investments with universities' for fear of government 
claims to resulting inventions. [FN30] This division remained until the 1980s, [FN31] which reinforced a 
separation between academia and industry in science research. [FN32] 
MIC continued on: the 1950s and early 1960s were dominated by the Cold War and a series of 
confrontations centered on science-Sputnik 1, launched on October 4, 1957, followed by the Bay of Pigs 
Invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and placement of man on the moon, all of which increased demands 
that federally funded science produce tangible applications. [FN33] The federal government grew 
impatient with academic research and diminished its funding. [FN34] “The annus horribilis, 1968, 
brought an end to the expansion of academic research and anguish over the role that the university had 
assumed.” [FN35] While universities served as bastions for *107 anti-government protests, government 
and public sentiment soured further. [FN36] The 1970s proved a challenging decade for academia as 
government decided to give much less. [FN37] 
 
C. Era of Integration Among Government, Academia, and Industry 
 
Integration among government, academia, and industry was a phenomenon of the 1980s. By the end of 
the 1970s, the country faced double-digit unemployment. [FN38] A severe oil shortage necessitated 
harsh rationing and caused prices at the pump to skyrocket. [FN39] The country was in an economic 
crisis, and the public was frustrated with both big government and big business. [FN40] Demand for 
more R&D and economic stimulus grew deafening. [FN41] Congress was shoved into action. [FN42] 
Taxpayer investment in academic research was not leaving university filing cabinets, and legislation was 
enacted to bust them open to help stimulate the economy. [FN43] Specifically, Congress enacted 
legislation that put into motion an intense academia-industry science policy that, through globalization, 
has impacted the world's science norms. The primary pieces of legislation, both enacted in 1980, are the 
Bayh-Dole Act [FN44] and the Stevenson-Wydler Act: [FN45] 
*108 The legislative intent of Bayh-Dole was, through reform of patent policy related to government-
sponsored research: (1) to enable and encourage universities, not-for-profit corporations, and small 
businesses to patent and commercialize their federally-funded inventions and (2) to allow federal 
agencies to grant exclusive licenses for their technology to provide more incentive to businesses. [FN46] 
The net result is a “give away” of invention created with federal taxpayer dollars for commercial 
application, which has integrated government, academia, and industry in science research. [FN47] This 
policy effectively “unlocked all the inventions and discoveries that had been made in laboratories 
throughout the U.S. with the help of taxpayers' money.” [FN48] The impact on research institutions, 
researchers, and science itself has been profound: “A fruitful collaboration between academic 
researchers and industry promised to fuel not only economic development but also new sources of 
revenue for universities. A vast movement of privatization was underway by the mid-1980s, and it 
reinvigorated research universities.” [FN49] 
From the 1990s onward, government, academia, and industry have integrated with explosive intensity, 
“giving rise to all the benefits, concerns, *109 and controversies that accompany such dramatic and 
rapid change.” [FN50] As stated by one observer, “It has turned universities into commercial entities, 
created a multibillion-dollar industry of technology transfer, and subsidized virtually every 
biotechnology company and discovery of the past twenty-five years.” [FN51] The integration has gone 
global. [FN52] 
 
III. The Drug Development Dilemma 
 
Drug development has made a profound impact on human health. As recognized by Dr. Marcia Angell, 
former Editor in Chief of the New England Journal of Medicine and vocal critic of today's drug industry: 
No one would want to be without, say, insulin for diabetes, antimicrobial agents to fight infections, 
vaccines to prevent a host of serious diseases, anticlotting agents to treat heart attacks, chemotherapy 
for cancer, a panoply of effective painkillers and anesthetics, and many others. Gleevec is a major 
advance, as are Epogen and Taxol. Prilosec is important, too, as are statins and ACE inhibitors and many 
other drugs. All of these agents have extended and greatly improved our lives. [FN53] 
Moreover, although the secrecy of data makes the cost of developing new drugs mere estimations, it is 
beyond dispute that the endeavor is extraordinarily expensive and time-consuming, and the clinical 
failure rate is towering-approximately 80%. [FN54] Industry has invested enormously in recent years-for 
example, $45.8 billion in 2009. [FN55] The U.S. government also has invested tens of billions of dollars 
annually: the NIH budget *110 continues to hover at approximately $30.9 billion annually, [FN56] and 
tens of billions in taxpayer dollars have been invested annually since the 1990s. [FN57] 
Despite these accomplishments, enormous industry and government investment in basic research, 
[FN58] and the infusion of scores of research-enabling technologies in recent years, most notably the 
map of the human genome, [FN59] overall drug development has sunk into a state of doldrums-a 
fifteen-year slump. [FN60] Shockingly, in 2010, Pfizer Inc., the world's largest research-based 
pharmaceutical company, did not secure a single new drug approval. [FN61] “The bottom line has been 
a 45 percent decline in the company's share price between 2000 and 2005. Unfortunately, many of the 
likely replacements are targeted for niche markets that cannot possibly generate the sales of the huge 
products that preceded them.” [FN62] Discouraged, large drug makers are investing less: [FN63] 
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE 
*111 In addition, the perception of the public and many in the medical profession of the 
pharmaceuticals on the market is grossly inflated. Though most of those in need of health care want to 
believe wholeheartedly in pharmaceuticals, prescription drugs generally are unpredictable: a mere one-
third act as expected when prescribed to patients. [FN64] This uncertainty *112 “exposes patients to 
potentially harmful drug interactions and delays potentially effective or the ‘right’ treatment.” [FN65] 
Also, adverse drug reactions cause more than two million hospitalizations each year and 100,000 deaths. 
[FN66] In fact, the United States experiences more deaths from the legal use of prescription medications 
than from automobile accidents. [FN67] The poor performance of drugs already on pharmacy shelves 
contributes to the fact that medicine remains much more of an art than a science: 
Even today, with a high-tech health-care system that costs the nation $2 trillion a year, there is little or 
no evidence that many widely used treatments and procedures actually work better than various 
cheaper alternatives. 
. . . . 
. . . And while there has been progress in recent years, most of these physicians say the portion of 
medicine that has been proven effective is still outrageously low-in the range of 20% to 25%. [FN68] 
*113 Poor drug performance has shaken confidence in the FDA and triggered congressional action, 
[FN69] scathing reports from the Government Accountability Office and the Institute of Medicine, 
[FN70] and class action litigation, underscoring that drug development is in a problematic state and 
certainly not living up to its potential. [FN71] The FDA had to withdraw ten of its approved drugs for 
safety concerns between 2000 and March 2006, [FN72] and “[i]t has been estimated that as many as 
half of all new drugs have at least one serious adverse effect that is unknown at the time of drug 
approval.” [FN73] Vioxx is a notorious agency mistake-“a ‘scarlet letter’ the FDA is likely to wear for 
years to come.” [FN74] More mistakes were admitted in the fall of *114 2010. [FN75] The FDA 
“concluded that in some cases two types of drugs that were supposed to be preventing serious medical 
problems were, in fact, causing them.” [FN76] Specifically, Avandia, prescribed heavily to treat type-2 
diabetes, was associated with an increased risk of heart attacks and strokes-a serious problem for the 
target patient group given that two-thirds of diabetics die of heart problems. [FN77] Bisphosphonates, 
prescribed to prevent bone loss, was determined to actually cause thigh bone fractures and jawbone 
degeneration. [FN78] Again, frustrated, industry is paring back on research and channeling its funds into 
marketing. [FN79] It has outsourced clinical research to contract research organization (“CRO”) bean 
counters, who just make the data needed for approval happen. [FN80] Yet, in recent years government 
has increased dependence on industry to get clinical research done. [FN81] 
 
*115 IV. A Law-Policy Fix for the Drug Development Doldrums 
 
Many commercial drug developers and their supporters claim that the drop off in new drug approvals is 
due to over-regulation. [FN82] In fact, the opposite is true: industry is clinging to the low science and 
regulatory standards of the past, making bad and expensive decisions based upon these low standards, 
stretching the commercial lives of pharmaceuticals through manipulation of the patent system, and 
contriving “me too” drugs rather than engaging in genuine innovation. [FN83] 
Lax regulatory standards introduced in 1997 under the FDA Modernization Act (“FDAMA”) have enticed 
industry to engage in a race to the bottom. [FN84] Section 506B of FDAMA introduced a presumption in 
*116 favor of market approval contingent on follow-up studies, [FN85] which the FDA has not been 
enforcing and industry has not been performing. [FN86] This presumption is misplaced given that drug 
sponsors exercise extensive control over the content of new drug applications, [FN87] and the standard 
for market approval is to just outperform a placebo-meaning to be better than *117 nothing-with 
tolerable adverse events. [FN88] Once drugs reach pharmacy shelves, physicians have the discretion to 
prescribe them off-label regardless of the limitations of the data that put them on the market. [FN89] 
The approval process does not include head-to- head comparisons between new drugs and those 
already on the market. [FN90] 
The quantity and scale of clinical trials underway today is unprecedented-a reflection of the desperation 
of the biopharmaceutical sectors to replenish their revenue streams. [FN91] Clinical research is highly 
susceptible to manipulation. [FN92] As observed by Dr. Angell, “Trials can be rigged in a dozen ways, and 
it happens all the time.” [FN93] The so-called gold standard for generating clinical data is group design, 
which produces mathematical abstracts (probabilities) that represent the group under study as a whole, 
but not necessarily any individuals used to trigger the data. [FN94] Moreover, clinical research has been 
shifted from academic medical centers to commercial service providers- CROs. [FN95] An academic 
check on the *118 integrity of clinical research, the public nature of research promoted through the 
involvement of academia, has been lost. [FN96] 
As Dr. Angell explains: 
Until the 1980s, researchers were largely independent of the companies that sponsored their work. 
Drug companies would give a grant to an academic medical center, then step back and wait for faculty 
researchers to produce the results. They hoped their product would look good, but they had no way of 
knowing for sure. They certainly did not attempt to tell the researchers how to run their clinical trials. 
Now, however, companies are involved in every detail of the research-from design of the study through 
analysis of the data to the decision whether to publish the results. That involvement has made bias not 
only possible but extremely likely. Researchers don't control clinical trials anymore; sponsors do. [FN97] 
*119 When academic medical centers are involved, they often hold equity interests in research 
outcomes. [FN98] Many senior NIH scientists also hold financial entanglements in research outcomes. 
[FN99] The norm has become commercial controls on publication and a loss of data transparency. 
[FN100] 
Although the biopharmaceutical sectors maintain an army of lobbyists in the nation's capital, [FN101] 
disappointment with drug development has inspired law-policy interventions. Congress enacted the 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, which demands more scrutiny for market 
approval, extensive surveillance of pharmaceuticals on the market with a focus on health care 
outcomes, and dissemination of much more information to health care providers. [FN102] Also, 
regulations to protect human subjects are finally being revisited. [FN103] 
Still, more meaningful government intervention is needed to align drug development with its potential 
and to break through the existing doldrums. In the spirit of the Manhattan Project and HGP, the federal 
government should undertake clinical research and lessen reliance on industry for *120 advanced drug 
development. [FN104] There is some movement in this direction. Dr. Francis Collins, leader of the U.S. 
government's HGP effort and Director of the NIH, has proposed direct government involvement to 
convert the map of the human genome into human health benefits. [FN105] Specifically, he has 
proposed a National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (“NCATS”) to lift the drug development 
industries out of their steep fifteen-year slump. [FN106] “The central role for the proposed Center 
would be to establish and provide focused, integrated, and systematic approaches for building new 
bridges that link basic discovery research with therapeutics development and clinical care.” [FN107] The 
NIH is dissolving one of its twenty-seven existing entities to form NCATS and provide approximately $1 
billion in funding. [FN108] According to Janet Woodcock and her co-authors, there is new-found 
appreciation for the fact that “[i]nnovative drug development requires science and regulation to 
advance in concert. Nowhere is this need more apparent or urgent than in *121 the development of 
combination therapies.” [FN109] Contemporary genetics is about understanding disease pathways 
rather than just eliminating symptoms, and specialty care is emerging as a dominant focus in new drug 
approvals and patient treatment. [FN110] 
The federal government is moving in the right direction with NCATS, but it must go beyond basic (bench) 
science and plunge into clinical research. Obviously, the commercial sector is not rising to the occasion-it 
is not producing in spite of the proliferation of enabling technologies bequeathed to it through HGP and 
extraordinary investment. [FN111] The biopharmaceutical sectors have tremendous potential they 
simply are not realizing. [FN112] 
Just as the U.S. government intervened successfully in science to preempt Nazi competitors in the 
creation of the atomic bomb and more recently to complete a map of the human genome, the biology 
counterpart to the periodic table that evolves science into penetrating disease pathways, the United 
States must intervene in clinical research to boost drug development. [FN113] The NIH and FDA should 
work jointly in the endeavor given their distinguishable but complementary science focuses and staff 
skill sets. 
The FDA has precedent to intervene in clinical research independent from commercial sponsors. 
Through the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Congress enabled the agency to get pediatric studies 
done in spite of industry resistance. [FN114] The Act established a trust fund, which the FDA draws from 
to contract with third parties to accomplish the studies needed. [FN115] There also is NIH precedent. 
The NIH has made contributions that have directly facilitated private sector drug development, including 
the Molecular Libraries Program, the Therapeutics for Rare and Neglected Diseases Program, the Rapid 
Access to Interventional Development *122 Program, and the Clinical and Translational Science Awards 
Program. [FN116] This precedent is a foundation for the FDA and NIH to build upon and contribute to 
human health. 
Professor Epstein cautions against the infusion of new regulatory standards and expansion of the role of 
government in drug development: 
No way exists for government, try as it may, to take the lead in developing new commercial processes. 
Likewise, no way exists for government to take over the task of ensuring that all individuals receive the 
safest and most effective care, or even to set by edict some minimum threshold with which all private 
firms must comply. The implicit paternalism of the FDA and the tort system hurts the very people it is 
intended to help. [FN117] 
Henry Miller shares Professor Epstein's sentiment that the U.S. government should leave drug 
development to the private sector, and he opposes NCATS: “Government bureaucrats are rarely leaders 
of technological innovation. They are not qualified to act as venture capitalists in choosing the most 
promising and deserving commercial product to fund and develop.” [FN118] 
The thrust of Professor Epstein's position is that, in drug development, the low-hanging fruit has been 
picked and a slump was inevitable: 
I stated at the outset of this book that it is hard to return the pharmaceutical industry to its glory days of 
fifty or sixty years ago. In the interim we have gathered all the low-hanging fruit. But the current 
challenge is not whether we can recreate the heady optimism of Vannevar Bush's 1945 praise of The 
Endless Frontier, any more than it is whether we can make the California gold rush last forever. [FN119] 
*123 Reality is that genomics and related disciplines (proteomics, bioinformatics, pharmacogenomics, 
and pharmacogenetics, to name just a few) have seeded new orchards with acreage that melts deeply 
into the distant horizon-adding dimensions of potential to the frontier of drug development. The drug 
development past, just taking away symptoms without understanding disease pathways, fortunately is 
not a reflection of the present and future. Genomics, the study of genetic expression, has introduced a 
new beginning, and there is an obligation to embrace it in drug development and to contribute as 
meaningfully as possible to human health. People's lives depend upon it-literally. The U.S. government 
must rise to the occasion and expend the resources necessary to better align drug development with its 
potential. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Reliance on government to solve dilemmas is not popular at this time, but in science, the U.S. 
government has a legacy of rising to the occasion. We need another intervention. This Article has 
embraced NCATS and proposed that more direct government involvement in human clinical research is 
necessary to lift drug development out of its doldrums. We already have made such an investment 
through HGP, and so much human life is at stake. Lost opportunity and, to say the least, disappointing 
performance for a sector that impacts all levels of human health and the national economy so 
fundamentally demands a government intervention in the spirit of the Manhattan Project and HGP. 
Industry pushed completion of the map of the human genome, but it did so by drawing from the public 
domain and working off of what the government effort had accomplished-the intellectual property 
placed in the public domain. The government's efforts also inspired a bountiful bouquet of enabling 
technologies along the way, from gene sequencing capabilities to DNA chips, that have enabled the 
global biotechnology sector. The project never would have been started without the U.S. government 
making a decision to fund it from 1988 to 2003 with a $3 billion investment. [FN120] 
It is time to move forward, and to make medical sense out of the map of the human genome and the 
universe of enabling technologies the effort has inspired. Drug development is off track, dismally so, and 
a government intervention is essential to reach the potential already framed by the vested government 
investment in the map of the human genome. It is time to *124 move forward and embrace the 
opportunity to improve human health introduced through contemporary genomic science. 
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